As informal street vending has proliferated in many Indonesian cities, some local governments have sought to relocate food vendors from the streets to public purpose-built markets. A number of such relocations have received widespread recognition for being managed without conflict, through engagement and participation and with limited confrontation. However, further examination reveals that the success of such policies is limited, many relocated vendors returning to the streets within a few years.

This chapter examines four different vendor relocation processes in two different Indonesian cities, conducted between May 2015 and January 2016. It illuminates why informal food vendors return to the streets and how urban policies and planning might better incorporate informal food distribution activities into the formal market.

11.1. Literature review

Policy and planning approaches to street vending are deeply informed by ideological and normative assumptions about urban poverty and informality, which shape problem definitions as well as solutions (Cardoso et al. 2004; Bromley 2000). When street vending was associated with backwardness, degeneration and filth, the common response was eradication or removal. More recent problem definitions in terms of lack of urban amenities or services and of market opportunities prefigure prescriptions of urban upgrading and extension of property rights (Donovan 2008;
Roy 2003; Deininger and Binswanger 1999). As critiqued by Ananya Roy (2004; 2005), the resulting public efforts often prioritise and legitimise physical and environmental improvements at the cost of vendors’ livelihoods, rights and political participation. Further, such efforts unwittingly perpetuate inequality by giving advantage to the upper and middle ranks of low-income communities. Roy attributes informality to state planning and the workings of capitalist urbanisation and economic development, thus generalising the relationship between informality (as imbued in and practised by the urban poor) and the state in oppositional terms.

Yet, cities vary in their local governance formations and policy innovations, some undertaking progressive efforts to plan with informality, as illuminated by recent studies of participatory and collaborative street vendor relocations in Indonesian cities (Phelps et al. 2014; Bunnell et al. 2013). Despite initially ‘successful’ relocation policies, these efforts have struggled to produce enduring outcomes. This fact betrays underlying linear, means–end reasoning and traditional divisions of labour whereby local governments typically define the problem, determine goals and choose and implement courses of action, which then impact on various stakeholders. Although such approaches suit ‘tame problems’, street vending appears to be a ‘wicked problem’ – highly uncertain and dynamically complex, involving various causalities, interdependencies and unintended consequences of action (Rittel and Webber 1973). Because of vending’s characteristic of multiple, interdependent and diverse stakeholders with their respective interests and demands, participatory and collaborative planning approaches that prioritise public engagement, multi-sector partnership and co-production might be more successful (Healey 1997; Forester 1999; Innes 1995). Moreover, the extended, shifting trajectories of street vendor policies beyond their immediate successes, complete with emerging needs and challenges, also calls attention to the critical importance of incorporating existing forms of collective action and provisions for continual policy learning and innovation as discussed by the growing scholarship on adaptive governance (Duit and Galaz 2008; Folke et al. 2005).

To study our relocation cases, we adopt Roy’s ‘planning epistemology of informality’ to examine why certain food vendors may end up returning to the streets after being relocated to purpose-built markets. We also explore mitigating factors and transformative policy and planning alternatives involving differently resourced and abled partners, including local authorities. Though government is one among many decision-makers and actors, it nonetheless tends to set the rules that determine systemic interactions and emergent dynamics.
In what follows, we investigate the ways in which relocation efforts, which deliver improvements to public spaces including purpose-built markets, fall short of upgrading vendor livelihoods or even meeting their day-to-day needs. We also explore why simply extending property rights fails to address the sociospatial, economic and political disparities underlying urban poverty and informality. Finally, we study how relocation efforts can recognise and enhance the rights of street food vendors in the city or facilitate meaningful political participation to promote more sustainable policy outcomes.

11.2. Research methodology

We carried out a comparative study of four different vendor relocation cases in the ‘sister’ Indonesian cities of Solo and Yogyakarta in Central Java. While the two are similar in population – half a million within the city limits and four million in the metropolitan area – Solo is known for its traditional handicraft and textile industries as well as a series of progressive policies under Mayor Jokowi, while Yogyakarta is a regional capital and art, education and tourism hub. The study focused on the market relocation sites of the Pasar\(^1\) Notoharjo and Pasar Punggunrejo market projects in the city of Solo (see Figure 11.1) and Yogyakarta’s Taman Kuliner and Gajah Mada University’s Food Court.

These two cities received recognition in the national popular press for having undertaken broad-based, popular and presumably successful campaigns to remove street vendors from public spaces. They are notable because the approach adopted in three of the four market cases contrasts with the more widespread practice of employing physical force and coercion to relocate informal markets. However, despite the use of collaborative methods and fiscal incentives, many of the vendors abandoned the public markets they had been assigned to, and returned to the streets.

Our study was carried out by a team of five researchers from the local Indonesian NGO Yayasan Kota Kita. Researchers conducted in-depth interviews with a total of 40 current and former vendors, including food vendors, between May 2015 and January 2016. Those interviewed included vendors who had been involved in the relocation processes and decided to remain in the new facilities, as well as an equal proportion of those who had returned to the streets (typically, their original locations, but also including new street market locations). Interview questions sought to understand the backgrounds and experiences of food vendors; their perspectives on street vendor relocation policies; their reasons for
and experiences of remaining in or abandoning the market facilities; and their thoughts and recommendations on how the city might better support food vendor relocation policies in the future.

11.3. Description of cases

11.3.1. City of Solo

Since 2005, Solo’s long-term development plan has explicitly sought to improve the welfare of the people and to improve the city in accordance with the idea of Solo as ‘cultural city’. The official mission to support the ‘people’s economy’ (*ekonomi masyarakat*) as the first development priority translated into several policy programmes, including micro-economic development, support for cooperatives, street trader management, revitalisation of traditional markets, and promotion/capacity-building for market traders (business management). The city lacks an explicit vision or policy programme for street food vending and food markets. However, general street trader management and support programmes also pertain...
to street food operations. These general programmes include government registration, relocation and integration from public space to purpose-built markets and the upgrading of mobile vending stalls at select locations. Despite the city’s overarching vision and policy programmes with regard to street trading, actual policy processes and outcomes have varied.

11.3.1.1. Pasar Notoharjo, Solo

Informal trading grew dramatically in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 as many unemployed workers in Solo congregated in Banjarsari Park (a public space in the middle of the city) and became vendors. At its peak, the park was bursting with 1000 vendors, leading to complaints by nearby residents about noise, trash and lawlessness. This informal market was becoming the city’s most visible public issue. Repeated attempts to force the vendors away, largely through the violent action of the police, were unsuccessful.

In 2005, a new mayor, Joko Widodo, tried a fresh approach. The Mayor (now President of Indonesia) invited the street traders and other stakeholders to over 50 open dialogue meetings. The rapport and personal relationships that he built were instrumental in convincing them to support his relocation plan, which was implemented within a year’s time. The negotiations included significant concessions from the government, including the development of a new purpose-built market, the provision of stall ownership certificates, and access to business loans to support the vendors’ businesses. The government also responded to vendors’ concerns that the relocation site was too remote and disconnected from the city, by surfacing roads, installing signage, designing new bus routes and promoting the new market through the media.

With a parade of vendors through the streets to the new location called Pasar Notoharjo, the ceremonial fanfare and celebration helped to attract the attention of the public and raise the credibility of the move. Yet, during the first year, many traders complained they had lost their customers and were struggling to make ends meet as a result of the new location. Some sold their stalls and returned to the streets but eventually came back when the market started to attract more customers after the first year.

11.3.1.2. Pasar Punggunrejo, Solo

In the eastern part of Solo, a main road that runs alongside the Sebelas Maret University campus featured a high-density informal market. This market was started in the late 1990s by about 160 small-scale traders
Figure 11.2  Map of where streets traders were transferred to – Pasar Klithikhan Notoharjo and Pasar Panggunrejo – the case study relocation sites in Surakarta. (Source: KOTA KITA)
who had congregated there. As the city prepared for the construction of a strategic urban project, the Solo Techno Park, Mayor Jokowi sought to clear the vendors from the north side of the road. However, the density of existing land use in the campus area limited relocation options to a site that sat behind a government building, out of view of the main road.

Paguyuban Pedagang Sekitar Kampus (PPSK), an association of traders established in 2000, strongly opposed this relocation plan, contesting the proposed new location for the market, and sought concessions from the government such as stall titles at their existing locations. However, when the street vendors faced negative public opinion and pressure from the university, the PPSK conceded (see Figure 11.2).

Between January 2008 and December 2009, 201 traders were relocated to Pasar Punggunrejo. Just a few years later, almost all of these relocated traders had abandoned the new market for the streets. Those who sold food, phone credit and spare parts – drawing upon students as their primary client base and requiring convenient access points – were the first to go. Despite having gained stall certificates, vendors complained of having been forced into the move with no government promotion of the market, technical assistance, or access to loans. Many felt that street vending would give them easier access to clients (see Figure 11.3).

Figure 11.3  After selling his stall, a street vendor returns to Jl. Dewantoro in Solo to sell sate. He never found success in Pasar Panggunrejo. (Source: KOTA KITA / Dennie Ramon)
11.3.2. Yogyakarta

Yogyakarta is a medium-sized city in Central Java comparable to Solo, but known as a city of students (200,000 attend a total of 140 colleges and universities). It has aimed to become a quality education city, a centre of cultural tourism, a people’s economy and a place offering environmentally friendly services. However, its approach to street trader management has been somewhat ad hoc. Vendor policies were first couched as part of the post-earthquake infrastructural upgrades in 2007, then promoted under the auspices of cultural tourism in 2008. Next the city incorporated street vendor policy into efforts to improve human settlements and public facilities in 2010, followed by efforts to ‘tidy up’ the city in 2011. In its current plan, the city cites uncontrolled street trading in major city streets as an acute problem requiring active street-to-market

Figure 11.4  Challenging conditions made it difficult for relocated vendors to thrive. The site planning and design of Pasar Panggunrejo, Solo, have made it a challenge for relocated food vendors to operate there. Three storeys, narrow corridors and a location removed from the main road meant that many vendors didn’t find success and have since moved out. (Source: KOTA KITA / Dennie Ramon)
relocation efforts and zero tolerance of further growth of street trading. So far, the local government has exercised a high level of discretion in regulating street trades, including street food vending (see Figure 11.5).

11.3.2.1. Gajah Majah University, Yogyakarta
Many informal vendors congregate in public spaces and streets near and within universities like Gajah Majah University (UGM) to draw patronage from students and the wider public. In 2005, the university, with support from the city government, sought to improve circulation by banning vehicular traffic and street vending and relocating existing vendors to three on-campus, purpose-built facilities.

Initially the vendors demanded in situ upgrading instead of the move. But, as a result of negotiations with the public authorities, the vendors agreed to relocate upon gaining assurance that the process would be inclusive and the new site would be improved with needed amenities. Staggered over time, the relocation of the southern area was completed in 2009, the eastern area in 2012 and the western area in 2015. Each site offered a food court for exclusive use by food vendors. Each vendor received a stall with a kitchen area, plumbing and sewage. The food courts also featured eating areas for students with wi-fi and public toilets. However, the food courts remained cut off from the main streets as part of the closed campus policy. (see Figure 11.6).

Supported by advertising and promotions, the food courts initially enjoyed high levels of popularity. Yet, over time, the clientele declined. Although almost all the food vendors remain on site, they do so for lack of other options.

11.3.2.2. Taman Kuliner, Yogyakarta
A second relocation occurred immediately outside the gates of UGM, this time along the Selokan Mataram, a popular location for students, passing motorists and pedestrians seeking food and school supplies. Blaming street vendors for traffic congestion and littering, the local government decided to relocate the vendors, but without the negotiation and participatory planning processes of the earlier UGM relocation.

After the announcement of the need to move street vendors, the actual relocation took another three years to be implemented, during which time the vendors were kept in a state of limbo about their future location. Moreover, the vendors were not involved in the site selection or the design of the purpose-built market. Eventually, 120 vendors – 40 of whom were food vendors – were relocated to Taman Kuliner Condongcatur.
Figure 11.5  Map of where street traders around the Universitas Gadjah Mada University were transferred to – UGM Food Court and Taman Kuliner, Condongcatur – the case study relocation sites in Jogyakarta. (Source: KOTA KITA)
This new location was promoted as a destination for domestic tourists, despite being significantly removed from major roads and having little visibility. Although the site came equipped with electricity, clean piped water, sinks, sewage and public spaces for eating and for children to play, the design was problematic because many of the stalls were not facing outwards and were hidden from sight and difficult to access.

Taman Kuliner was initially successful, partly thanks to promotional events organised by the management, such as arts festivals and traditional bird calling competitions. These events declined in frequency as time went on and finally stopped as more and more vendors closed their stalls. Nine years after the relocation, only four out of the 120 vendors remained, the rest having returned to the streets.

11.4. Findings

This section summarises our findings as to why informal street food vendors from the four market sites returned to the streets after ‘successful’ relocation and upgrading efforts. We also comment on how policy and planning interventions might prevent such unfavourable outcomes in the future.
11.4.1. The new markets offer aesthetic solutions with little functionality

Many street food vendor relocations delivered improvements in the visible quality of public spaces and purpose-built markets but failed to pay comparable attention to physical functionality and locational factors – key concerns of vendors. Respondents repeatedly indicated that markets better accommodated their needs around food preparation, storage and waste disposal as well as offering parking areas, public toilets, wi-fi access and even places to pray, all of which helped attract customers. But such improvements were offset by shortcomings in site design and infrastructural factors such as low visibility from the street and lack of integration of the market with the urban surroundings, which inhibited client access and patronage.

In interviews food vendors expressed most concern about issues of visibility and access, since their businesses were highly reliant on selling food to people on the go. At previous locations, food vendors used tarpaulins or sheets both to separate eating customers from the street and to advertise their business. Located away from main roads, central or busy areas and, most importantly, the sight of potential customers, the purpose-built markets overlooked the critical requisites of marketing and access for successful food vending. Purpose-built markets such as Taman Kuliner or Pasar Notoharjo were located on, respectively, government-owned properties off main roads and on the outskirts of the city. Solo’s Pasar Punggungrejo was imperceptible from the road because the location was set back from the main road and required customers to enter through a narrow lane. Eko, a trader who left Punggungrejo for the streets, remarked,

The market is not accessible for students ... I only had a limited number of regular customers, who knew me from my previous location. When they graduated, it was very difficult to find new customers due to the non-strategic location. So I had to move out.

Interviewed food vendors also commented that site designs failed to consider internal circulation and access. In Pasar Klitikan Notoharjo, relocated vendors complained that they were positioned on upper floors of two- or three-storey buildings where few customers ventured. Moreover, food vendors were arranged in long narrow rows alongside non-food stalls and were made to use concrete benches for food preparation. Food vendors preferred ‘food court’ arrangements where stalls face clients and
provide food preparation areas, storage and drainage for better hygiene and presentation.

Finally, food vendors highlighted locational considerations such as market proximity and access to large customer bases, whether in residential or commercial areas. Whereas mobile vendors can control their location and visibility by moving to strategic areas, vendors in purpose-built markets face more enduring circumstances. In Taman Kuliner, the lack of dialogue between vendors and the city precluded opportunities to troubleshoot the site’s remoteness. The Pasar Notoharjo relocation of 2007 was a contrasting story. During this project, Mayor Jokowi listened to the vendors’ concerns about the site’s remoteness from the rest of the city. As a result, his administration extended bus routes, surfaced streets and undertook a promotional campaign to integrate the area with its surroundings and improve its reputation and popularity. This finding indicates that locational variables can be more or less maximised depending on the extent to which vendor relocation and site planning processes prioritise dialogue, negotiation and a commitment to finding mutual benefits for street vendors and the local authorities.

11.4.2. The relocation policies fail to prepare vendors for changing clientele and business environments

For street food vendors, relocation goes far beyond moving to a new location. The fixed market location means that vendors need to accommodate the tastes and preferences of a changed clientele and adjust to a more competitive business environment. The failure of relocation policies to prepare vendors for such wide-ranging demands limits their effectiveness and durability.

Most relocated street vendors lost their previous customer base, since food patronage tends to be highly location specific. For instance, some interviewed vendors previously served students from certain universities whereas others catered to taxi drivers on particular roads. At the relocation sites, customers often demanded a higher quality of food, wanted more choices and were willing to spend more time eating than those eating at street stalls. As relocated vendors had to adapt to their new clientele, those specialising in one type of food and cooking style struggled much more than those able to diversify offerings and accommodate the different tastes of new customers.

Among vendors who enjoyed success after relocation, recurring themes included the adoption of a competitive mindset, adaptability to new customer demands, and continuing relationships with existing...
clients. Whereas success in street vending can result from simply offering a product or service when and where it is needed, bricks-and-mortar businesses succeed through developing a brand or reputation and winning repeat patronage, whether owing to the quality or reliability of the offering or to strengthening relationships with customers. Given the difficult challenge for food vendors in public markets of differentiating products from one another, many purveyors respond by offering distinct dishes, in terms of flavour or regional origin. As Antok, the head of a Solo-based traders’ association, put it:

There are some reasons people fail or succeed here: level of tenacity, type of commodity, amount of capital, extent of knowledge based on experience and education, and social links or networks. To win competition, first we should become distinct in the quality of our product, service delivery, and price because the competitors are not just those in this site but also the many new street vendors who have not been relocated.

On the streets, food vendors can gain competitive advantage through mobility and outperform competitors by finding superior sites. But at fixed sites competition is more direct. Some vendors have adapted by offering special deals to customers to generate new business and otherwise exploring creative and enterprising marketing strategies. According to Bu Mukti, one of the very few who stayed at the Taman Kuliner site, ‘To be a food trader in this empty market, I have to be creative in selling my food, including giving bonus to someone who can bring me a big order.’ As most of her peers have returned to the streets, the implication is that vendor preparedness to adjust to a more competitive business environments within fixed locations not only varies considerably but also tends to be sorely lacking.

11.4.3. Policy and planning processes neglect the ongoing and emerging needs of vendors

Our findings indicate that government commitment to vendor outreach and participatory planning is instrumental to the relocation process, but that maintenance and support are also needed beyond the transition phase. At present, policy and planning processes neglect the ongoing and emerging needs of vendors following relocation.

In the relocation of street vendors from Solo’s Banjarsari Park to Pasar Notorejo in 2007, Mayor Jokowi’s deep engagement was critical to
building trust, obtaining mutual concessions and producing a satisfactory outcome. The Mayor employed dinner invitations, site visits and participatory planning processes involving the vendors, their associations and intermediary non-governmental and community-based organisations.

On the other hand, street-to-market transfers have been less successful in cases of vendor exclusion from planning processes and inconsistent or stalled implementation. In Solo’s Pasar Pungunggrego, the government relocated one group of traders while allowing others to remain in the streets. This resulted in increased tension among vendor groups and diminished faith in government. In Yogyakarta the three-year delay in relocating vendors from outside UGM, in addition to their exclusion from decision-making processes, exacerbated their dissatisfaction with the eventual selection of a site.

Once markets have been inaugurated, consistent maintenance is instrumental to continued operation and success. This follow-up includes the regular provision of basic services (e.g. clean water, sewage, trash collection) and the initiation of promotional campaigns. In Punggunrejo, the accumulation of trash and inadequate maintenance led to falling hygiene levels, site deterioration and eventual decisions of many vendors to depart. In the case of both Yogyakartan city markets, the discontinuation of promotional campaigns resulted in falling customer volumes. The importance of factors like adequate parking and hygiene levels should also be noted.

Moreover, relocated vendors require ongoing training and support with their acquisition of financial literacy, management skills and other capacities to succeed in business in a fixed-location, formalised market environment. In relocating street vendors from Solo’s Banjarsari Park to Pasar Notorejo in 2007, the Jokowi administration offered concessions of stall ownership certificates and access to business loans. In so doing, it unwittingly presented added economic risks and burdens to the poorest vendors, who lacked finance know-how and were often seduced into selling their certificates in times of unexpected hardship.

Rizal, a trader from Solo’s Punggunrejo market, remarked, ‘Many traders have low education levels. Most of us are afraid to borrow money from the bank. We don’t really have a clear understanding of how it works and feel insecure about the risk.’ Some commented on feeling trapped in their new positions because competitive concerns led them to obtain loans in order to enlarge their stock, which newly exposed them to financial risks. The vendor Purman, of Solo’s Pasar Notoharjo, explained, ‘Immediately after I got the stall from the government, I borrowed money from the bank [with stall as collateral] just to add commodities, but after
a year I didn’t have enough revenue so I abandoned the stall and went back to the street and the bank seized it.’

Given the limits of government capacity, non-governmental organisations, trade associations and micro-credit financial institutions can step in to provide targeted training and technical assistance as well as to mediate further negotiations with local authorities. Reflecting on the potential of self-organisation and more sustained engagement by civil society organisations, Aa, a community-based organiser said, ‘After relocation, the government should empower the vendor association to protect themselves legally, run soft saving and loan programmes, get better leverage, and run mutual help associations to counter adversity.’ In the case of Solo’s Pasar Notoharjo, such local organisations played an instrumental role in allowing the vendors to address common concerns as they arose and correspond with the Mayor in a coordinated manner. On the other hand, the city exploited differences among vendors in Pasar Punggunrejo to weaken their bargaining position.

11.5. Policy and planning implications

Our study also suggests lessons for improving urban policies and planning with respect to relocating street food vendors and promoting their long-term success at new sites.

11.5.1. The need to deliver pro-poor and inclusive spatial interventions

Current street food vendor relocation policies appear to focus on reclaiming public space from low-income street vendors and relocating the vendors into aesthetically pleasing new markets. We suggest that spatial interventions also need to improve the economic prospects of the vendors and address the socioeconomic, political and spatial disparities underlying urban poverty and informality.

Certainly, relocated food vendors could benefit from designated spaces for food preparation, storage and waste disposal within markets as well as the provision of parking areas, public toilets, wi-fi access and places to pray. However, upgrading vendor livelihoods to ensure vendors remain in the markets long term requires effective site designs, such as ones that arrange food stalls in visible and accessible ways within market sites. Given the practical experience and grounded knowledge of food vendors, incorporating their perspectives and preferences on stall
arrangements and locations within markets is likely to advance the viability of new facilities. Programmes also need to be initiated which promote the visibility of markets from the street and integrate the markets with the urban surroundings. Aside from infrastructural elements that strengthen connectivity between market sites and major circulation routes or pedestrian access paths, locating markets in proximity to large customer bases, whether in residential or commercial areas, is likely to promote their long-term viability.

What is ultimately needed is an explicit commitment to pro-poor and inclusive spatial interventions. In Solo, vendor relocation efforts were part of a larger local campaign of economic empowerment (of the urban poor) and building a people’s economy, which partly entailed campaigns promoting the reputations of public markets. Pro-poor and inclusive spatial policy and planning should go far beyond persuading informal food vendors to abandon public spaces for designated marketplaces. It requires attention to vendor rights in the city, including their proximity and connectivity to major residential and commercial clusters as well as major transport networks. Within the markets, pro-poor and inclusive processes of strategic spatial planning and management might engage food vendors in thinking through their particular offerings and the complementarity between products and services so as to apportion space and assign stalls in ways that promote success for everyone.

11.5.2. From market-centric approaches to community-based wealth generation

Relocation policies are more likely to have lasting results if they incorporate technical assistance and training for food vendors. Vendors should be taught to adapt to customer demands and to expand business through branding and marketing strategies. Food vendors might also benefit from coordinated bulk purchases of ingredients and supplies or complementary menu offerings within a food court or marketplace.

Awarding relocated vendors certificates of perpetual stall ownership, though intended to advance their economic prospects, often has the opposite effect. The exposure of street vendors to a new market environment and competition can make them economically vulnerable. The provision of stall ownership certificates, which in turn enable access to bank loans, presents new economic risks and burdens in the absence of technical assistance and training. Vendors clearly require more support than the provision of new facilities, even with a formal certificate, given their lack of experience of working in formal conditions and, in some cases, of
paying taxes and monthly rent. Being poor, they also have generally low levels of education and are often reluctant to take out loans.

11.5.3. From the policy cycle to collaborative, adaptive governance

Local governments should enable vendors to resolve emerging issues and engage with government planners when they need to. For instance, vendors’ associations or other non-governmental organisations could oversee maintenance, including the provision of basic services (e.g. clean water, sewage, trash collection), skills training and promotional campaigns, to ensure the enduring success of public markets. Meanwhile, government could focus on consistently enforcing rules and regulations to ensure fair competition or on improving the public accessibility of markets, for instance, through subsidised bus fares or modifying infrastructure to improve circulation and walkability in the markets’ vicinity.

On site, vendors are more likely to support stall reapportionments that are based on the varying profiles and the needs of the different vendors if there are mechanisms for shared decision-making and the distribution of collective gains. Vendors may form a cooperative, in which each member owns shares, contributes business revenue as a share of their profits and takes out dividends (perhaps based on a combination of individual and group performance as well as number of shares). Moreover, vendors could participate in shared decision-making about product and service placement within markets, improvement of common spaces, and marketing campaigns. They should proactively engage the city to deliver infrastructural improvements and other public works and services that will improve market sites’ connectivity to the rest of the city and the resulting public patronage.

Note

1. *Pasar* in Bahasa Indonesia means ‘market’ in English.

References


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